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The Illinois Superfund Law

Prior to the Brownfields Legislation
JAMES

T. HARRINGTON*

I. LIABILITY FOR CONTAMINATED PROPERTY
UNDER FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The federal Superfund statute, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),' imposes
liability on certain individuals and companies for the remediation of properties that release or threaten to release "hazardous substances."
A. LIABILITY

"Hazardous substances" are defined in CERCLA 2 to include hazardous
waste as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 3
materials listed or designated as toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act
(FCWA),4 any hazardous air pollutant listed under the Clean Air Act
(CAA),5 any imminently hazardous chemical substance listed under the
Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA),6 and any additional substance
designated pursuant to the Act.7 A listing of hazardous substances can be
found at 40 C.F.R. § 302.
Section 107(a) of CERCLA 8 defines the persons liable for the
remediation of property contaminated by hazardous substances. 9 Among
* B.A., J.D., University of Notre Dame; Partner, Ross & Hardies, Chicago. The

author acknowledges the major contribution of summer intern Siegmar Pohl.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1994) amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99,499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994) for the statutory definition.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1994).

4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1317 (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994).

6. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1994).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
9. The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth
in subsection (b) of this section -
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those liable are: the current owner and operator of a vessel or a facility;
under some circumstances, the previous owners and operators of any
facilities that disposed of relevant hazardous substances; persons who
arrange, for example by contract, for disposal or for the transportation for
disposal of hazardous substances; and transporters of hazardous wastes, if
they select the disposal sites, and if a release or the threat of a release of the
substance concerned occurs at these sites. Basically, anyone who ever had
contact with the relevant hazardous substance can be found liable for
remediation costs.
The extent of liability is specified in § 107(c) of CERCLA.'
The
responsible parties are liable for all costs of remedial action" incurred by
the United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the National
Contingency Plan, other necessary response costs 2 consistent with the
National Contingency Plan, and damages for injury to natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of13assessing such injury resulting from the
release of a hazardous substance.

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence
of response costs, of a hazardous substance ......
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1994).
11. See Thomas v. Outboard Marine Corp., 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). Thomas clarifies
that "response," remedial" or "removal" action, as used in § 104 of the Act, includes entry
on a waste site.
12. In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1962 (1994), the Supreme
Court held that a private litigant's activities in identifying other potentially responsible parties
were "necessary costs of response." In contrast, litigation-related attorney fees for prosecuting
private response recovery action were not recoverable under CERCLA. Moreover, fees for
legal services during negotiations with the EPA that culminated in a consent decree were not
recoverable. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) reads as follows:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan; [and]
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The courts have held that liability under Superfund is joint and several,
except where the responsible parties can show that it is clearly divisible.'
Parties found liable at a Superfund cleanup can be held liable for the entire
cost even if they were only responsible for a portion of the material sent
there or the material they sent there only caused a small portion of the
costs.' 5s This is particularly onerous when there are large "orphan shares,"
16
or shares of clean up cost for which no responsible party can be found.
B. DEFENSES

Section 107(b) of CERCLA sets forth the only defenses under the
Act.' 7 The liability of an otherwise responsible person is excluded if he
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat
of release of a hazardous substance was caused solely by an act of God, an
act of war, or an act or omission of a third party.' 8 However, under
specific circumstances a person is not regarded as a third party, such 9as
acting in connection with a contractual relationship with the defendant.'
The third party exemption only applies if the defendant establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance concerned in light of all relevant facts

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such
a release...
See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbour Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution,
716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995);
County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991); See also Lynda J.
Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability under CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 299 (1995).
15. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin emphasized in City of Edgerton v. General
Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 517 N.W.2d 463 (1994), that voluntary settlement is preferable
to governmental cleanups, for which reimbursement is sought from the responsible parties.
Parties can contractually arrange for the allocation of the financial burden of CERCLA
liability. See James W. Conrad Jr., So Sue Me: Common Contractual Provisionsand Their
Role in Allocating Environmental Liability, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10219 (1996).
16. The case law involving joint liability is extensive. See, e.g., Laidlaw Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Borough of Sayreville v. Union
Carbide Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671 (D. N.J. 1996); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Ainger Corp., 909
F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp.
1249 (S.D. Il1. 1984).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).
18. Id.
19. See Keister v. Dow Chem. Co., 723 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
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and circumstances, and he or she took precautions against foreseeable acts

or omissions of any such third party and their consequences.2 °
C. INNOCENT LANDOWNERS

In addition to the defenses under § 107(b) of CERCLA, owners of
property from which there is a release or threatened release are not liable if
they are "innocent landowners." A landowner is "innocent" for the purposes
of CERCLA if he falls under one of the following three categories:
1. Pure security interests without more do not impose liability. Section
101(20)(A) of CERCLA provides: "[An owner or operator] does not
include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel
or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility."'"
2. According to § 101(20)(D) of CERCLA, state and local governments who obtain title involuntarily such as through bankruptcy, tax
delinquency, etc., and who do not contribute to the release or threatened
release are not deemed owners or operators.22
3. A purchaser of contaminated property who would otherwise have
no defense under § 107(b)(3) of CERCLA can escape liability through the
exercise of due diligence. 23 The term "contractual relationship" includes,
for the purpose of § 107(b)(3) of CERCLA, land contracts or other

20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). The full text of this section reads as follows:
(b) Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except
where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and
acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b)
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1994).
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instruments transferring title or possession, unless the defendant acquired the
contaminated real property after the disposal of the hazardous substance at
the facility.'
In addition to falling under any of these categories, the defendant must
show one of the following three circumstances in order to be exempted from
liability. 25 First, it must be shown that the defendants "did not know and
had no reason to know" that the relevant hazardous substance was disposed
of on, in, or at the facility.26 Second, government entities which acquired
the facility through involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the
exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation, are also
exempted from liability.27 Third, defendants who acquired the facility by
inheritance or bequest are not subject to recovery claims under Superfund.28
The first exemption requires that the defendant had "no reason to
know" about the contamination. This requirement is satisfied if the
landowner has undertaken, at the time of acquisition, "all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability."2 9 A
court will consider the defendant's specialized knowledge, as well as all
reasonably ascertainable information, including the purchase price of the
24. The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) reads as follows:
"The term 'contractual relationship,' for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3),
includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments
transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the facility
concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement
of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the
circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the

defendant by a preponderance of the evidence ...
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 35(A) (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(A)(i) (1994).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(A)(ii) (1994).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(A)(iii) (1994). However, U.S. EPA policy has claimed that

some minimal duty of due diligence still exists.

29. The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1994) reads as follows:

To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i) of
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the

time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into
account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated,

commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the
obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property,
and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
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property, and the ability to detect contamination by appropriate inspection.3
Section 101(35)(C) of CERCLA further specifies that none of the three
exemption circumstances noted in §§ 101(35)(B)-(C) or in § 9607(b)(3) shall
diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who
would otherwise be liable under CERCLA. Furthermore, no defenses are
available to a defendant who had actual knowledge of the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance at his facility and subsequently
transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing
such knowledge. Any such defendant is treated as liable under § 107(a)(1)
of CERCLA. 3 ' However, none of the defenses shall affect the liability of
a defendant who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the
release or threatened release of a relevant hazardous substance.32
D. SUMMARY

In short, under federal Superfund legislation and the numerous cases

interpreting it, anyone who purchases property knowing that it is contaminated to some degree may be found jointly and severally liable for the
remediation of the property. Absent some form of relief,33 contaminated
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1994).
31. The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C)-(D) reads as follows:
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish
the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would
otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the
defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the real property
and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person
without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under
section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under section 9607(b)(3) of this title
shall be available to such defendant.
(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this chapter of a
defendant who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the subject of the action
relating to the facility.
32. Id.
33. On the federal level, the only Brownfields initiative so far is the funding of fifty

redevelopment projects of abandoned urban sites. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA (1995). Among the many proposals to revise the

federal Superfund program, is the recent suggestion by legislators in the 104th Congress to
address Brownfields in the federal Superfund statute. See Environmental Law Reporter,
Recent Developments In the Congress, Overview, June 1996, in 26 ENVTL. L. REP., Volume
Year XXVI, News and Analysis, 10312.
For further discussion of Superfund reform issues, see, e.g., Scott C. Whitney,
Superfund Reform: Clarification of Cleanup Standards to Rationalize the Remedy Selection
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industrial property which cannot be returned to pristine conditions will find
neither a buyer nor a lender.3 It will remain out of the development loop,
off the tax rolls, and a drag on the neighborhood and city in which it is
located.35
It should be remembered, however, that an owner or operator of
contaminated property is under no obligation to remediate the property
unless there is an administrative or judicial order to that effect. More
specifically, the federal or state government can only recover costs which
are "not inconsistent with the national contingency plan," and private claims
36
are only recoverable if they are "consistent with the ... plan.@
II. ILLINOIS SUPERFUND LAW
A. STRUCTURE
Illinois' Superfund law was essentially the same as federal law in terms of regulated
substances 37, persons liable, and required cleanups. Now, however, it differs in the structure
of the remedies available to the state. The recent Brownfields legislation3 8 repealed joint
and several liability in favor of proportionate liability based on causation. The provisions of
39
Illinois' Superfund law are scattered through the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
4°
("the Illinois Act").
Process,20 COLUM. J. ENVTL.L. 183 (1995); John Pendergrass, Use ofinstitutionalControls
as Part of Superfund Remedy: Lessons from Other Programs, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10109
(1996).
34. See James T. Harrington, Lender Liability Under Superfund: The Saga Continues
as EPA Steps In, ENvTL. WATCH, Spring 1991, 2.
35. For a general view of the economic impact of Brownfields issues, see E. Lynn
Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10337 (1995); Howard M.
Shanker & Laurent R. Hourcl, ProspectivePurchaserAgreements, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10035
(1995).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). For the burden of proof concerning the consistency
with the plan, see United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d
726, 747 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
578 (D. Md. 1986).
37. See, e.g., National Envtl. Services Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 570
N.E.2d 1245 (I11.
App. Ct. 1991). The Fourth District Appellate Court held that "hazardous
waste" within the meaning of the Act includes infectious medical hazardous waste. Id.
38. For an introduction to Brownfields legislation, see R. Michael Sweeney,
Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup-Legislation, 2 ENVTL. L. 101 (1995);
Grayson & Palmer, supra note 35.
39. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1(West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
40. For an overview of agencies, other administrative bodies, their functions, and the
rulemaking process under Illinois environmental law, see James T. Harrington, The Structure
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Section 22.2(f) of the Illinois Act provides that the same persons are liable under the
Illinois Act as under the federal Act, including the owners and operators"' of facilities
'2
where there is a release or threat of release, any person who at the time of the disposal
who arranged for the disposal of the hazardous
one
any
facility,
the
on the owned or operated
43
substance, and transporters who selected the site of disposal.
The terms "facility" and "owner and operator" are defined in section 22.2(h). The
provisions are similar to the federal ones, but important clarifications have been made.
B. FIDUCIARY LIABILITY

The Illinois Act is more explicit than the federal act with regard to
fiduciary liability. Section 22.2(h)(2)(D) provides that the fiduciary is not an
owner or operator. Instead the trust assets themselves are considered the
owner. Section 22.2(h)(2)(E) further defines lender liability to protect the
lender from liability even in the case of foreclosure and possession if the
lender does not exercise actual managerial control over the facility that
causes a release or the threat of release. In addition, section 22.2(h)(2)(F)
provides that individuals owning residential property are not "owners or
operators" unless they own ten or more units or the individual or his agent
caused the release or threat of release.
C. DEFENSES

Section 22.2(j) provides the same basic defenses as federal law with
additional provisions for innocent landowners incorporated directly into the
section. Section 22.2(j)(6) provides the same essential definition of
"innocent landowner" as the federal law (i.e., a purchaser who made all
appropriate inquiry, taking into account the nature of the property; the price,
as well as any specialized knowledge that the purchaser may have).

of the Illinois Environmental Program (Mar. 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with
Ross & Hardies, Chicago).

41. In People v. Brockman, 550 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), the court had to

decide whether section 22.2(f) of the Illinois Act permits third party actions. In this case, a
landfill operator who was sued by the State could assert third party claims under the Illinois
Act against generators and transporters who potentially had contributed to the disposal of
unpermitted wastes at the landfill.
42. The definition of "release" was at issue in People v. Van Tran Electric Corp., 503

N.E.2d 1179, (Il. App. Ct. 1987). Under section 3(ww), a release of a hazardous substance
does not fall under the scope of the Act if it results in exposure to persons solely within a
workplace. However, if it can be established that the released substance migrates off the
property of the workplace, a release of a hazardous substance within the meaning of the Act
is given.
43. See, e.g., Central Ill. Light Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 626 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993). See also Brockman, supra note 41.
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Section 22.2(j)(E) establishes a detailed description of what constitutes
an appropriate inquiry and establishes a rebuttable presumption against the
state and a conclusive presumption against private individuals if the owner
had undertaken the specified investigations prior to the purchase. The
examination must be undertaken by a qualified professional other than a
practicing attorney who is qualified by education and experience to
undertake the investigation and who is either a registered professional
engineer or carries $500,000 in insurance.
A detailed Phase I examination, including review of the public records,
the site, and the history of the property, must be conducted. If the Phase I
indicates the presence or likely presence of hazardous substances, then a
Phase II examination including intrusive testing of soil and groundwater is
required.
Taken together, these stringent requirements make it very difficult to
prove that an investigation that did not discover the contamination of a site
was adequate.
D. EXTENT OF THE LIABILITY

Section 4(q) of the Illinois Act provides that the Illinois Environmental

Protection Agency may give notice to a responsible party specifying the

cleanup to be undertaken at a site. If the responsible party fails to carry out
the directed remediation," section 22.2(k) provides that the state may
recover the cost of the cleanup, plus three times that amount as punitive
4
damages.
E. SUMMARY

Under Illinois Law, as under federal law, the owner or operator of
contaminated property may be held liable for the cost of remediation.

44. The liable party may seek contribution from response action contractors if they can
establish, in good faith, grossly negligent or intentional conduct on the side of the contractor.
See Brockman, supra note 41.
45. In City of Quincy v. Carlson, 517 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), the court found
that this provision is not mandatory. A potentially responsible party can make a good faith
defense and challenge the validity of the agency's order prior to the imposition of punitive
damages. No damages will be awarded if the potentially responsible party can establish that
he acted "without sufficient cause," according to section 22.2(k) of the Illinois Act.
The forum for hearing cost-recovery actions is the Pollution Control Board or the
circuit court; both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction. People v. NL Industries, 604 N.E.2d
349 (Ill. 1992). See also People v. Van Tran Electric Corp., 503 N.E.2d 1179 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987).
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There is no liability for cleanup unless a notice has been received from
the state or the state has incurred liability not inconsistent with the Illinois
contingency plan or a private party has incurred costs consistent with the
plan.
III. THE ILLINOIS VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM
Prior to the passage of the recent Brownfields legislation, Illinois had
established a Voluntary Cleanup or "Pre-Notice" program for voluntary
cleanup of sites under state supervision. By cleaning the site voluntarily,
potentially responsible persons hoped to receive a release from liability from
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency.46
A. REVIEW AND EVALUATION

According to section 22.2(m), the EPA may offer "review and
evaluation services for actions at sites where hazardous substances may be
present," provided the owner or operator submits a written work plan, allows
for Agency inspection, agrees to perform the work as approved by the
Agency as47well as to pay the Agency costs, and makes an upfront payment
of $5,000.
B. RELEASE PROGRAM

Section 4(y) of the Illinois Act states:
The Agency shall have the authority to release any
person from further responsibility for preventive or
corrective action under this Act following successful
completion of preventive or corrective action undertaken
by such person upon written request by the person.
Further guidance on the release from further liability was developed by
the Agency. On July 12, 1993, the Agency issued the Illinois Pre-Notice
Site Program, which included the Agency's guidance for the voluntary
cleanup program and enumerated the steps necessary to obtain a release.
Sites eligible for the program could not be subject to current enforcement
action or administrative orders or notices by the state or federal governments. Cleanup requirements under the federal law such as RCRA were not
applicable to eligible sites either. The guidance provided detailed require-

46. See James T. Harrington, The Illinois Voluntary Clean Up Program: A Panacea
or Trap Problem?, ILL. MFR., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 14.
47. See People v. NL Indus., 604 N.E.2d 349 (III. 1994).
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ments for the program including particular requirements for the Work Plan
and Site Safety Plan for Remedial Investigation.
The cleanup objectives for the site were to be established by the
Agency. The general objectives which came to be applied were taken from
the underground storage tank program. They were based on the Illinois
Pollution Control Board's Groundwater Regulations. They required that
both the groundwater and the soil above it achieve the stringent state
groundwater standards. This was often called the "drinkable dirt" standard.
It should be noted that groundwater standards were not based on what
concentrations remediation could achieve in the soil, but on the federal
drinking water standards for potable water and the level of treatment which
could be obtained from treatment technologies in order to achieve the
drinking water standards. The Agency also provided for site specific
standards to be established by an Agency working group, but these seldom
ever formed the basis for a section 4(y) release. As a consequence, there
was a great deal of uncertainty as to what standards the agency would apply,
and how the agency decided how clean a remediated site had to be.
C. THE PROGRAM IN PRACTICE

Many sites entered into agreements with the Agency for supervision of
voluntary cleanup efforts. The ,reasons were varied, but they included the
desire to seek an Agency release and, more often, the desire to avoid an
Agency directed cleanup under 4(q) of the Illinois Act. Of the sites that
entered the program, only a few obtained a release under Section 4(y) of the
Illinois Act.
The Agency readily accepted the program and obtained a Memorandum
of Understanding with the United States Environmental Protection Agency
to the effect that the federal agency would not challenge the State's release.
However, industry and the real estate community did not accept the program
for various reasons. Most importantly, the program was not very practical,
because the cleanup standards required to obtain a release were both overly
rigid and practically unobtainable for many sites. The drinkable dirt standard
was both a bad joke and reality. In addition, the program did not always
take into account background contamination found in old industrial areas.
Furthermore, the Agency had complete control over the procedures and
cleanup standards without review by the Pollution Control Board 48 or the
courts. The program did not provide for the use of institutional controls

48. The functions of the IEPA and the Pollution Control Board are defined in sections
4 and 5 of the Act. See also City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 311 N.E.2d 146 (II1.
1974), People v. NL Indus., 604 N.E.2d 349 (I11.1992).
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such as deed restrictions limiting future use of the property. An abandoned
chemical plant would have to be cleaned up as though it were to be used as
a playground.
The review time for plans, objectives and work plans often seemed
long and frustrating. Given the frustrations, industry worked through its
trade groups to redesign49 the program to be more user friendly and to
encourage the redevelopment of property throughout the state.5" While the
program originally advanced by industry met considerable resistance from
the Agency, the recent Brownfields legislation was mutually accepted and
is a workable scheme for the redevelopment of contaminated industrial sites.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both federal and state law impose significant liability on the owner of
contaminated property unless they are an innocent purchaser. By definition,
industrial property usually puts a purchaser on notice of potential contamination, and it is very hard to prove that an investigation that did not discover
the contamination was adequate. Property that is discovered to be contaminated suffers a loss of market value, saleability and loanability which may
make it impossible to return it to productive use.
Only a program with reasonable and knowable standards, known
procedures, and reasonably predictable results concluding in an acceptable
degree of protection for owners, future owners and mortgage lenders will
encourage widescale redevelopment. The original Illinois Pre-Notice
Program was not perceived as meeting this test. It was in everyone's interest
to establish a program that would both work and be perceived to work
fairly. Both interested provided parties and the Agency came to realize that
a mutually agreeable program could be developed through negotiation and
form the basis for the Brownfields legislation.

49. For a discussion of industry's opportunities to participate in the rulemaking
process, see James T. Harrington, The Importance of Negotiations in Illinois Environmental
Rulemaking and Overview of the Illinois Environmental Regulation Process, 13 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 531 (1993); James T. Harrington & Barbara A. Frick, Opportunities for Public
Participationin Administrative Rulemaking, 15 NAT. RESOURCES L. 537 (1983).
50. See James T. Harrington & David L. Rieser, The Industry Brownfield Initiative,
ILL. MFR., May/June 1995, at 8.

